

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**  
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**Operational Level Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for**  
**Special Operations Forces**

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## **Introduction/Thesis**

Although each of the services Special Operations Forces (SOF) have established procedures for some type of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process at the tactical level, there is currently no product which addresses joint SOF operational level IPB requirements. Additionally, it is not uncommon to observe a duality of effort in the IPB process with the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander and Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) commander each receiving separately developed IPB products. This duality can and does often result in a loss of synergy and reflects a lack of unity of effort. Lastly, there appears to be some question as to how the IPB process can aid the JTF commander in the selection of appropriate SOF targets.

Operational level IPB for the JSOTF commander requires a degree of detail normally considered to be at the tactical level by conventional forces. As a result, the JSOTF commander's IPB requirements will not be satisfied by traditional operational level IPB analysis provided to the JTF commander. In the interest of unity of effort and economy of force, IPB support for the JSOTF commander is best accomplished by utilizing the IPB analysis provided to the JTF commander as a baseline, and developing supplemental SOF mission specific IPB analysis.

## **Background**

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is defined as a "systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, Washington, DC, 8 July 1994, 1-1.

Also referred to as Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIPB)<sup>2</sup> or intelligence mission planning, the purpose of this process is to provide the commander with a comprehensive, detailed "view" of the battlefield environment and enemy forces in order to assist him in deciding when, where, and how to give battle. This process is conducted at all levels of war, from strategic to tactical. At the strategic level, the Area of Interest (AOI) can and often does encompass the entire world with considerations such as world opinion, national will, and reactions of neutral regional states. The operational level interests narrow down the JTF commander's AOI and include factors such as the potential effects of third-nation involvement, press coverage, terrain suitability for large force movements, and enemy logistics capabilities. Considerations at the tactical level are focused on the specific area assigned to conduct operations and on the enemy forces units assigned to or near those areas.

Regardless of the level supported, the basic IPB process is the same. The U.S. Army has developed a structured approach consisting of four basic steps:

- 1) defining the battlefield environment
- 2) describing the battlefield's effects
- 3) evaluating the threat
- 4) determining the threat Courses of Action (COAs).

Field Manual (FM) 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 8 July 1994, is the Army's doctrinal guide that describes the fundamentals of this process. Other services utilize a less structured approach but the outcome is similar: a product or products that provide the

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<sup>2</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations (Joint Pub 2-01) (Washington, D.C.: 20 Nov, 1996), II-2.

commander (at each level) with the information he requires to plan and execute his mission most efficiently and effectively.

In the first step of the formal Army IPB process, "defining the battlefield environment", the Area of Interest (AOI) is specified and battlefield characteristics which will impact friendly or enemy actions, such as weather, terrain, and demographics are identified. In the second step, "describe the battlefield's effects", the effects that the previously identified battlefield characteristics will have on friendly and enemy operations are evaluated. The threat or enemy is evaluated in step three, "evaluate the threat", identifying enemy capabilities, tactics, organization, etc. In step four, "determine threat COAs" the results of the first three steps are integrated to determine the possible threat courses of action.

The less structured mission planning approach used by the other services evaluates the same factors and provides the same general support to the commander. The one obvious advantage to the Army IPB process is that, by virtue of its structured approach, less experienced intelligence personnel are provided greater guidance. One could also argue that this would be a drawback if it were to limit the analyst's evaluation to only those factors identified in the field manual. However, the Army doctrine contained in FM 34-130 was never intended to preclude the consideration of new or unique factors in the analysis of the threat and battlefield:

*"This manual is intended to serve as a guide for the use of IPB by units of all types, at all echelons, across the entire spectrum of conflict, and during the conduct of any mission. It does not contain all the data required to conduct IPB... rather, it is intended as a guide for applying the fundamentals of the IPB process to any situation."<sup>3</sup>*

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<sup>3</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, Washington, DC, 8 July 1994, iv.

### **Relationship between IPB and SOF**

*Information from reconnaissance and surveillance units and elements in contact with the adversary should be integrated with intelligence from other sources. Forward and engaged combat forces must be tasked to collect and report information. They have unique opportunities to collect significant information.<sup>4</sup>*

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) often have a symbiotic relationship wherein SOF requires detailed IPB products to support mission planning and the IPB process often requires additional critical information obtainable only by SOF assets. This relationship is especially evident at the operational level. The JTF commander utilizes the IPB process to assist him in deciding when and where to accept battle and how to move and place his forces and resources. In the same manner, the JSOTF commander also requires IPB to determine when and where appropriate SOF assets will be most efficiently and effectively utilized. Concurrently, the IPB process frequently obtains critical information from SOF missions, in support of the JTF commander, that would not otherwise have been available. In fact, the IPB process is often incomplete without this SOF specific type information.

In addition to being tasked with Special Reconnaissance (SR) missions in support of strategic, operational, or tactical level IPB, SOF often find it necessary to incorporate SR into, or prior to other assigned missions due to the lack of critical intelligence needed for the execution of those missions. Conventional intelligence collection capabilities are often insufficient to provide the JSOTF commander with the information he needs to determine the what, when and how to best employ his forces to accomplish an assigned mission. For

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example, if the JSOTF commander is tasked with conducting a Direct Action (DA) mission to neutralize an enemy facility, he may determine that he first needs to deploy an SR mission to collect information on anti-SOF measures at or enroute the facility, personnel routines, locations of key equipment, etc. The information he obtains will assist in the completion of his IPB requirements and ultimately aid him in the determination of the best SOF assets to employ.

This process continuously enhances IPB efforts at all levels provided the information obtained is disseminated to appropriate intelligence organizations. Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, states that "all intelligence collection, production, and dissemination capabilities of the components and elements of the joint force should be employable for any requirement of either the JFC" (Joint Force Commander) "or any force component or elements."<sup>5</sup> There are however, potential sensitivities to disseminating some information obtained by SOF that must be evaluated and protected by the JTF commander, JSOTF commander, and the staff intelligence officer (J2). Factors such as need to know, sensitivity of the SOF mission, impact on operational surprise, etc., must first be considered. This fact is also recognized in Joint Pub 2-0; "Intelligence must be readily accessible by those who need it, while still adhering to security standards of need-to-know and protection of classified information and intelligence sources and methods."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations (Joint Pub 2-0) (Washington, D.C.: 05 May, 1995), IV-9.

<sup>5</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations (Joint Pub 2-0) (Washington, D.C.: 05 May, 1995), IV-11.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.



### IPB Support to the JSOTF Commander

*Special operations missions are intelligence-driven and intelligence-dependent. They require immediate and continuous access to information from traditional, as well as nontraditional sources. Special operations generally rely on formal intelligence structures; but for certain sensitive missions, tactical and operational information must be developed using SOF assets such as advance or reconnaissance forces.*

Field Manual (FM) 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 8 July 1994 and FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, 30 September 1991 describe detailed tactical level IPB guidelines. FM 34-130 describes the process of IPB and breaks out examples of specific IPB considerations for special staff and support units (e.g. aviation, electronic warfare, intelligence, signal & special operations, etc), as well as for operations other than war (e.g. humanitarian assistance, support to domestic civil authorities, raids, combatting terrorism, etc.). Many of these unique mission areas apply directly to SOF's standing principal missions (e.g., civil affairs, combatting terrorism, special reconnaissance, etc.) and collateral activities (e.g., humanitarian assistance, combat search and rescue, counterdrug activities, etc.) as shown in Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix A.

FM 34-36 was written specifically for SOF and includes a fairly detailed chapter on IPB for SOF broken down by mission requirements. However, this information, along with the guidelines in FM 34-130, was primarily designed for tactical level IPB. While FM 34-130 does include a very small chapter describing the differences in tactical, operational, and strategic level IPB, most of the IPB factors listed are primarily intended for conventional type warfare. The section describing special staff and support unit requirements in FM 34-130 is also primarily directed towards tactical level support. No joint product currently exists which specifically describes operational level IPB for SOF.

By virtue of the missions assigned, the level of intelligence detail for SOF at the tactical level is often significantly greater than what is required for conventional forces. The same is true at the operational level. The JSOTF commander typically requires a much more detailed IPB assessment than the JTF commander to determine which, if any, of his forces will be capable of accomplishing the operational tasks he has been assigned. Where the concept of operational art attempts to address the bridge between strategic and tactical levels of war, in SOF, because the tactical level requires a much deeper level of analysis, the operational bridge must span a much greater breadth of considerations. The JSOTF commander may even require strategic level support as some SOF missions, such as Psychological Operations (PSYOP), support strategic objectives or have strategic impact.

For the JSOTF commander, knowing if an enemy has anti-swimmer capabilities is just as important an operational decision factor as the ability of a beach to support amphibious operations is to the JTF commander. If the JTF commander tasks the JSOTF commander with conducting a Beach Landing Survey (BLS) to determine the adequacy of a beach for an amphibious landing, the presence of anti-swimmer defenses will significantly impact the JSOTF commander's execution of that mission. This example illustrates the difference in the degree of detail required in the operational level IPB process for the JTF and JSOTF commanders. Likewise, where the JTF commander must consider the locations and compositions of enemy forces in a target area, the JSOTF commander considers whether those forces have any counter-SOF detection capabilities such as infrared (IR), dogs, or even geese. These are not just tactical considerations for SOF - this information is critical for the

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<sup>7</sup> Assistant Secretary of Defense/Commander in Chief US Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 1998, 1.

JSOTF commander to determine if a mission is feasible as well as the most efficient and effective means of employing his forces.

One can argue that other operational level subordinate commanders also require additional, more detailed IPB support than the JTF commander. While this is true, the level of detail required for conventional military operations is not as great as it is for the JSOTF commander. Additionally, some form of established intelligence preparation of the battlefield is available for each of these components. It is also valid to argue that operational level IPB requirements for conventional force commanders, tasked to conduct operations other than war (OOTW) similar to the standing SOF missions, are no different than the JSOTF commander's requirements. FM 34-130 states that:

*The four steps of the IPB process remain constant regardless of the mission, unit, staff section, or echelon. The art of applying IPB to operations other than war is in the proper application of the steps to specific situations. The primary difference between IPB for conventional war and operations other than war is focus - the degree of detail required - and the demand for demographic analysis required to support the decision making process.<sup>8</sup>*

In the larger IPB issue, commanders conducting OOTW missions will require a level of IPB support similar to the JSOTF commander. For these conventional force commanders, as well as those conducting conventional military operations, a standardized joint operational level IPB type process would also be useful. Although the focus of this paper is on operational level IPB support to SOF, the logic described applies equally to those conventional force commanders.

With his own organic intelligence support, the JSOTF commander has the capability of obtaining a specially tailored IPB product independent of the JTF commander's IPB. The

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<sup>8</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, Washington, DC, 8 July 1994, 6-1.

problem with this approach is the risk of disparity between the IPB results each is provided. When two different intelligence staffs develop their IPB analysis separately, with different concepts of critical factors and possibly even different intelligence sources, there is bound to be some difference in the final product. Whether it is the initial IPB analysis or subsequent IPB development during the operation, this duality can and does lead to differences in the battlespace picture. This violates the principle of unity of effort and inevitably will result in confusion. It is crucial that the JSOTF commander utilizes the same basic battlefield picture that the JTF commander is basing his decisions on.

Another problem with this approach is that valuable information available to the JSOTF intelligence staff may never reach the JTF intelligence staff if the two work independently. This problem has been experienced during past Commander, Second Fleet Joint Task Force Exercises (JTFEX) where SOF reconnaissance reporting was only occasionally provided to the JTF Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE). Without this type information, the JISE is unable to completely fulfil its responsibilities as described in Joint Pub 2-0:

*The subordinate joint force JISE, with the intelligence staff, manages collection, analysis, and fusion of intelligence and dissemination up and down echelon of intelligence and products for the JOA. The JISE, through the J-2, as the focus for intelligence support to joint operations, is the hub of intelligence activity in the JOA and is responsible for providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation by integrating and adding to the adversary situations developed by the combatant commanders' intelligence organizations.<sup>9</sup>*

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<sup>9</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations (Joint Pub 2-0) (Washington, D.C.: 05 May, 1995), VII-12.

Since the IPB process is the same, and the same basic information is required by both commanders, it makes much more sense for the JSOTF commander to use the standard operational IPB analysis prepared for the JTF commander as a baseline. This will ensure continuity of the intelligence picture provided the JTF commander and the JSOTF commander, and it should promote increased interaction between intelligence staffs. Additionally, since there are normally limited intelligence assets available to develop these IPB products, it is far more efficient to develop a common baseline. For his specialized requirements, the JSOTF commander will have his intelligence staff or JTF JISE personnel develop supplemental IPB products to accompany the baseline.

The supplementary IPB needed by the JSOTF commander will depend on the type missions assigned. A PSYOP mission requires significantly different information than a Direct Action (DA) mission. In a PSYOP mission the AOI is generally large, frequently even larger than that of the JTF commander, as it encompasses third party factors that could potentially become involved in an operation.

One might argue that a component commander's AOI would not exceed that of the JFC. Although the JSOTF commander may work with and support the JFC, may also conduct missions (e.g. PSYOPs), in support of JTF objectives, for the CINC. This situation occurs when the JSOTF's command authority at the combatant command (COCOM) level is the CINC while he is operationally assigned (OPCON) to the JFC and he is supporting both.

Other PSYOP considerations will include cultural, ethnic, religious, and political demographics, to name a few. DA mission requirements are much different. The DA mission AOI normally includes only the target area and ingress/egress routes. More

important than demographic factors are specific details about the defending and local forces - location, composition, etc. Each of the SOF missions has its own specific IPB requirements.

There are some SOF missions for which a supplemental product is not applicable. Several missions, notably Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Unconventional Warfare (UW), and special activities, will frequently be conducted independent of a Joint Task Force. For these missions the JSOTF commander will require a complete, comprehensive IPB product. Several other missions, such as Combating Terrorism (CT), Counter Drug (CD), or Counter Proliferation (CP), which may or may not be conducted in conjunction with a JTF, may also require a complete IPB analysis.

FM 32-130 and FM 34-36 provide valuable tactical level factors from which one can develop supplementary operational level SOF requirements. The sample matrices in Appendix B are representative of the type listing of mission specific supplemental IPB factors that could be utilized to support the JSOTF commander. These matrices are meant to be a starting point from which a more thorough product can be developed. A comprehensive product should be developed based on input from U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the theater Special Operations Commands (SOCs). In the event the JSOTF commander does not have sufficient organic intelligence support necessary to develop the supplemental IPB requirements he needs, standardized guidelines (such as these matrices) become even more important, as most intelligence personnel have very little knowledge of or experience with SOF missions and requirements.

## Can IPB Aid JTF Commanders in Selecting Appropriate SOF Targets?

*Intelligence identifies and nominates relevant and attainable military objectives through assessments of adversary capabilities, intent, and exploitable vulnerabilities. Once military objectives are determined, they become the guidelines for defining intelligence requirements to support subsequent operational decisionmaking.<sup>10</sup>*

The IPB process can aid the JTF commander in selecting appropriate SOF targets during the overall targeting process inasmuch as the process identifies factors that he must apply forces to counter. It would probably be better stated that IPB aids the JTF commander in selecting appropriate enemy targets during the overall targeting process. The decision to utilize SOF or conventional forces in these circumstances will depend on far more than the IPB process alone. The IPB process aides the commander in the identification of critical intelligence gaps, specific enemy strengths that may be targeted against friendly critical vulnerabilities, and critical enemy targets that must be degraded or destroyed to complete his overall objectives. This process is only one of the many tools or considerations that the commander utilizes in determining what forces to use, how to use them, and against which objectives or targets they must be applied.

As intelligence personnel develop the IPB picture for the operational commander, it often becomes evident that the commander will need additional critical information in order to determine the best means to accomplish his objectives. Will the terrain support movement of forces through a given area? Where are enemy forces concentrated in a densely forested area? Will the beaches support amphibious landing craft? When existing intelligence information is insufficient to answer these critical questions the commander must then decide

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<sup>10</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations (Joint Pub 2-0) (Washington, D.C.: 05 May, 1995), III-1.

what other resources are available to him to obtain this information. SOF assets are one of the possible options that he will consider.

When the IPB process identifies enemy strengths, which can be applied against friendly force critical vulnerabilities, the commander will find it necessary to take action to protect his forces. Threats can include weapons of mass destruction and enemy SOF. Once again the commander must determine which of the forces and capabilities available to him are best suited to counter these threats. The JTF commander may choose to utilize SOF in circumstances where there is insufficient time to employ conventional forces, there is a requirement for a small footprint, political sensitivities, or in the pursuit of the element of surprise.

The IPB process will also identify key enemy targets that the commander must apply forces against to accomplish his overall objectives. Normally the commander will first consider more conventional means with which to address these targets. Putting a man on the ground in a hostile environment to accomplish a mission that could be done just as effectively using other means will not necessarily be the most efficient use of available forces. The same factors - time, footprint, political sensitivities, surprise - all may influence the JTF commander in his decision to utilize SOF.

These concepts are equally valid in a permissive or peacetime situation. Several SOF missions (e.g., civil affairs, security assistance and humanitarian assistance) are regularly conducted during peacetime as part of the Theater Combatant Commander's (CINC) theater engagement plan. The greatest difference in a permissive environment is the level of risk associated with having SOF forces employed. In fact, the JTF commander is often more likely to utilize SOF forces than conventional forces in some permissive situations because of



their regional focus and specialized skills. These situations include missions requiring skills in areas such as Civil Affairs (CA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Humanitarian Assistance (HA).

In summary, the IPB process will identify intelligence shortfalls, enemy critical strengths and other critical factors that the JTF commander must address. It is in this capacity that the IPB process can aid the commander in determining when, where and how to allocate his forces. The measure of risk, value of the objective, and operational requirements among other factors will collectively determine the JTF commander's choice of forces to use in any given situation.

#### **Future IPB considerations for SOF**

Projections for the future indicate not so much a change in future SOF missions as a change in the environment in which they will be executed. General Shelton references several sources as he describes a future adversary who, as a result of the proliferation of advanced technology and weaponry, is far more capable and dangerous than the adversaries of today.<sup>11</sup> Where today, the SOF role in Information Warfare (IW) might be to physically disrupt an enemy's Command and Control (C2) network, in the future they may be tasked with electronically penetrating these networks and installing viruses or deceptive information to confuse or deceive the enemy.<sup>12</sup> Intelligence support that will be required to support these future operations will need to be far more detailed than what is required or available today. Intricate network and software analysis information will be necessary. Additionally,

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<sup>11</sup> General Henry H. Shelton, "Special Operations Forces: Looking Ahead", Special Warfare, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 1997, 4.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 6.

effectively deceiving the enemy will require detailed knowledge of his operational procedures. All these evolving information requirements will need to be incorporated into the IPB process at the JSOTF level to support SOF.

Other factors that will continue to evolve as we progress into the future include the changing cultural and demographic issues, as well as nation state actors being replaced by ethnic, philosophical or other special interest type groups (e.g. narco-traffickers, criminal organizations). As these factors change and battlefields shift towards urban areas, a far more complicated environment must be evaluated as part of the IPB process. New intelligence requirements at all levels of warfare will continue to evolve. Those intelligence personnel conducting IPB must constantly re-evaluate the requirements for future SOF missions.

### **Conclusions**

SOF assets are not only supported by the IPB process, they are often a critical part of that process. This is true at all levels of war - strategic, operational, and tactical. IPB support to SOF at the operational level requires a much more detailed level of intelligence than conventional operational level IPB. This can best be accomplished by utilizing conventional operational level IPB products with specialized SOF supplemental products. The JSOTF commander's requirements are mission specific and the supplemental IPB products must be tailored to those missions being considered.

Given the anticipated changes in the future threat, and the corresponding changes in SOF missions, the IPB process for SOF can be expected to become even more demanding with ever greater levels of detail required. This fact will continue to challenge not only intelligence professionals developing the IPB for SOF missions but also the intelligence

community as a whole and especially it's collection capabilities. The symbiotic relationship in existence between IPB and SOF will of necessity develop even greater inter-reliance.

### **Recommendations**

USSOCOM, in conjunction with theater SOC's, should develop a comprehensive, mission specific operational level SOF IPB requirements listing. This product should be standardized across the services and promulgated as joint doctrine.

Prior to, or at the onset of JTF operations, the Joint Task Force JISE and Joint Special Operations Task Force intelligence support personnel need to coordinate the development of a baseline IPB product in order to ensure continuity of the battlespace picture. The JSOTF intelligence staff (or JISE if necessary) should then utilize a mission specific supplemental IPB product to meet the SOF commander's operational level intelligence requirements.

As the operation proceeds, JISE and SOF intelligence personnel must establish a close working relationship to ensure continued continuity in the battlespace picture and to facilitate the most effective flow of information to all JTF forces. It is essential that any information obtained during the course of a SOF mission be promulgated to the JISE for incorporation into the continuing overall IPB analysis process in support of the JFC. Further dissemination must be accomplished to the greatest extent possible, based on the sensitivity and criticality of the information.

Exercises, such as JTFEX's, should be scripted such that SOF mission reporting can be passed to the JISE for inclusion into the overall intelligence battlespace picture. If this capability and the relationship between the two components is not developed and exercised, it cannot be expected to work efficiently or effectively in a crisis situation. JISE personnel

need to develop the skills of processing information collected by SOF (including dealing with its inherent sensitivities), and SOF intelligence personnel must establish procedures for ensuring this information is promulgated to the JISE.

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADA - Air Defense Artillery  
AOI - Area of Interest  
AO - Area of Operations  
BLS - Beach Landing Survey  
C2 - Command and Control  
C3 - Command, Control and Communications  
C3I - Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence  
CA - Civil Affairs  
CBT - Combating Terrorism  
CD - Counter Drug  
CINC - Commander in Chief  
COA - Course of Action  
COCOM - Combatant Command  
COIN - Counter Insurgency  
CP - Counter Proliferation  
CSAR - Combat Search and Rescue  
CSS - Combat Service Support  
DA - Direct Action  
DZ - Drop Zone  
ECM - Electronic Counter Measure  
ESM -  
FAARP - Forward Area Arming and Refueling Point  
FID - Foreign Internal Defense  
FM - Field Manual  
HA - Humanitarian Assistance  
HLZ - Helicopter Landing Zone  
HM - Humanitarian Demining  
HUMINT - Human Intelligence  
IO - Information Operations  
IPB - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield  
IR - Infrared  
IW - Information Warfare  
JFC - Joint Force Commander  
JIPB - Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield  
JISE - Joint Intelligence Support Element  
JSOTF - Joint Special Operations Task Force  
JTF - Joint Task Force  
JTFEX - Joint Task Force Exercise  
LOC - Lines of Communication  
LZ - Landing Zone  
MANPAD - Man Portable Air Defense  
NBC - Nuclear, Biological and Chemical  
NEO - Noncombatant Evacuation Operations  
OOB - Order of Battle

OOTW - Operations Other Than War  
OPCON - Operational Control  
PSYOP - Psychological Operations  
ROE - Rules of Engagement  
RTM - Radar Terrain Masking  
SA - Security Assistance  
SOC - Special Operations Command  
SOF - Special Operations Forces  
SOFA - Status of Forces Agreement  
SR - Special Reconnaissance  
USSOCOM - U.S. Special Operations Command  
UW - Unconventional Warfare

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## Appendix A

### SOF Principal Missions

CP - Counterproliferation: The activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of U.S. government efforts to combat proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, including the application of military power to protect U.S. forces and interests; intelligence collection and analysis; and support of diplomacy, arms control, and export controls. Accomplishment of these activities may require coordination with other U.S. government agencies.

CBT - Combatting Terrorism: Preclude, preempt, and resolve terrorist actions throughout the entire threat spectrum, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), and resolve terrorist incidents when directed by the National Command Authorities or the appropriate unified commander or requested by the Services or other government agencies.

FID - Foreign Internal Defense: Organize, train, advise, and assist host nation military and paramilitary forces to enable these forces to free and protect their society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

SR - Special Reconnaissance: Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance actions to obtain or verify information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning characteristics of a particular area.

DA - Direct Action: Conduct short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel.

PSYOP - Psychological Operations: Induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator's objectives by conducting planned operations to convey selected information to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.

CA - Civil Affairs: Facilitate military operations and consolidate operational activities by assisting commanders in establishing, maintaining, influencing or exploiting relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operation.

UW - Unconventional Warfare: Organize, train, equip, advise, and assist indigenous and surrogate forces in military and paramilitary operations normally of long duration.

IO - Information Operations: Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.

Table 1<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Assistant Secretary of Defense/Commander in Chief US Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 1998, 3.



#### SOF Collateral Activities

Coalition Support: Integrate coalition units into multinational military operations by training coalition partners on tactics and techniques and providing communications.

CSAR - Combat Search and Rescue: Penetrate air defense systems and conduct joint air, ground, or sea operations deep within hostile or denied territory at night or in adverse weather to recover distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations. SOF are equipped and manned to perform CSAR in support of SOF missions only. SOF performs CSAR in support of conventional forces on a case-by-case basis not to interfere with the readiness or operations of core SOF missions.

CD - Counterdrug Activities: Train host nation CD forces and domestic law enforcement agencies on critical skills required to conduct individual and small unit operations in order to detect, monitor, and interdict the cultivation, production, and trafficking of illicit drugs targeted for use in the United States.

HM - Humanitarian Demining Activities: Reduce or eliminate the threat to noncombatants and friendly military forces posed by mines and other explosive devices by training host nation personnel in their recognition, identification, marking and safe destruction. Provide instruction in program management, medical, and mine awareness activities.

HA - Humanitarian Assistance: Provide assistance of limited scope and duration to supplement or complement the efforts of host nation civil authorities or agencies to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to, or loss of, property.

Peace Operations: Assist in peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations, and other military operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

SA - Security Assistance: Provide Training assistance in support of legislated programs which provide U.S. defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies or objectives.

Special Activities: Subject to limitations imposed by Executive Order and in conjunction with a Presidential finding and congressional oversight, plan and conduct actions abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives so that the role of the U.S. government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly.

Table 2<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Assistant Secretary of Defense/Commander in Chief US Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 1998, 4. A-2

## **Appendix B**

The proposed operational level SOF supplemental IPB matrices that follow were developed from information in FM 32-130, FM 34-36, and personal experience. These sample matrices are representative of the type listing of mission specific supplemental IPB factors that could be utilized to support the JSOTF commander. These matrices are meant to be a starting point from which a more thorough product can be developed. A comprehensive product should be developed based on input from U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the theater Special Operations Commands (SOCs).

Sample matrices were only developed for step one of the IPB process; "defining the battlefield environment." Each of the four steps would require a similar set of matrices. Special Operations Force missions that may be conducted outside the framework of a Joint Task Force (e.g. FID, UW, CT, CD or CP) will require a completely independent IPB analysis which includes all pertinent factors as there will be no JTF IPB baseline to work from. Separate matrices including all necessary operational IPB factors will be required for these missions.

Note: Some of the IPB factors in the following tables will seem the same as traditional JTF commander IPB requirements. These factors were included as part of the supplemental matrices because the degree of detail required for the specified SOF missions will be greater than what the JTF commander requires.

# Primary Missions

Step 1. Describe Battlefield Environment

| A  |   | B  | C   | D   | E  | F  | G     | H  | I  | J  |
|----|---|----|-----|-----|----|----|-------|----|----|----|
| 1  | Supplemental IPB Factors  | CP | CBT | FID | SR | DA | PSYOP | CA | UW | IO |
| 2  | Sympathies and reactions of regional population and organizations   |    | X   | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 3  | Threat, host nation, regional, and coalition partner national economies   |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  |    | X  |
| 4  | Threat, host nation, regional, and coalition partner national legal systems   |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  |    |    |
| 5  | Support base and political objectives of the threat government  |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 6  | Influence of the terrain and weather on military operations   | X  | X   | X   | X  | X  | X     | X  | X  | X  |
| 7  | Ability of the local infrastructure to support operations   | X  | X   | X   |    |    | X     | X  |    |    |
| 8  | Environmental health hazards - presence of persistent agents  | X  |     | X   | X  | X  | X     | X  | X  | X  |
| 9  | Areas or activities that might generate refugees moving into the AO and refugee flow  |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 10 | Unofficial organizations, including clans and tribes  |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 11 | Local government, including unofficial parties, meeting sites, activities, contentious issue, etc.  |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 12 | Para-military organizations & police forces   |    | X   | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 13 | Insurgent political or military structure and key personalities & leaders   | X  | X   | X   |    |    | X     | X  |    |    |
| 14 | Applications of elements of power (military, informational, economic, and political) by any party   |    | X   | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 15 | Threat on or near objective and along ingress/egress routes   | X  | X   |     | X  | X  | X     |    | X  | X  |
| 16 | Construction of key components of the target (e.g. hardened)  | X  | X   |     |    | X  |       |    |    | X  |
| 17 | Detection capabilities, battlefield sensors in vicinity of target or ingress/egress route   | X  | X   | X   | X  | X  | X     |    | X  | X  |
| 18 | Reaction time, size, and location of threat reinforcements  | X  | X   | X   | X  | X  | X     |    | X  | X  |
| 19 | Evaluate all demographic factors: ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, political, ideological, tribal, and linguistic groups, locations and densities |    | X   | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 20 | Key leaders and communicators in area   |    | X   | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 21 | Cohesive & divisive issues within the community   |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 22 | Attitudes towards the US  |    | X   | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 23 | Literacy rates and levels of education  |    |     | X   |    |    | X     |    |    |    |
| 24 | Any concentrations of third-country nationals in AO, their purposes and functions   |    |     |     |    |    | X     | X  |    |    |

# Primary Missions

Step 1. Describe Battlefield Environment

| A                        |   |    |     |     |    |    |       |    |    |    |
|--------------------------|---|----|-----|-----|----|----|-------|----|----|----|
| Supplemental IPB Factors |   |    |     |     |    |    |       |    |    |    |
| 1                        |   | B  | C   | D   | E  | F  | G     | H  | I  | J  |
|                          |   | CP | CBT | FID | SR | DA | PSYOP | CA | UW | IO |
| 25                       | Recommendation of which groups to focus efforts on  |    |     | X   |    |    | X     |    |    |    |
| 26                       | Locations, capabilities & accessibility of mass media facilities  |    |     |     |    |    | X     | X  |    |    |
| 27                       | Evaluation of host-nation civic action programs   |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  |    |    |
| 28                       | Population and resource control   |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  |    |    |
| 29                       | Civilian labor  |    |     | X   |    |    |       | X  |    |    |
| 30                       | Material procurement  |    |     | X   |    |    |       | X  |    |    |
| 31                       | Hostile government CA strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities   |    |     |     |    |    | X     |    | X  |    |
| 32                       | Historical or holy sites  |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  |    |    |
| 33                       | Anti-swimmer defenses   | X  | X   |     | X  | X  |       |    | X  | X  |
| 34                       | Identify threat airfields within range of the AO  | X  | X   |     | X  | X  | X     |    | X  | X  |
| 35                       | Identify possible flight routes outside the AO  | X  | X   |     | X  | X  | X     |    | X  | X  |
| 36                       | Effectiveness of host nation military and law enforcement agencies  |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 37                       | Host nation counter drug efforts  |    |     | X   |    |    |       | X  |    |    |
|                          | Identify pertinent demographic and economic issues (living conditions, religious beliefs, cultural distinctions, allocation of wealth, political grievances, social status, political affiliations) |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 38                       |   |    |     |     |    |    |       |    |    |    |
| 39                       | Evaluate terrorist activities in nations that sponsor terrorist groups  | X  | X   | X   |    |    |       | X  |    |    |
| 40                       | Identify any time constraints that might limit the availability of a target   | X  | X   |     | X  | X  |       |    |    | X  |
| 41                       | Identify threat reaction forces   | X  | X   |     | X  | X  | X     |    | X  | X  |
| 42                       | Evaluate target area  | X  | X   |     | X  | X  |       |    |    | X  |
| 43                       | Identify the locations of all groups that might influence NEO   |    |     |     |    | X  |       |    |    |    |
| 44                       | Identify outside influences on peace enforcement (e.g. world organizations and news media)  |    |     |     |    |    | X     | X  |    |    |
| 45                       | Evaluate strategic location; neighboring countries, boundaries, and frontiers   |    |     | X   |    |    | X     |    | X  |    |
| 46                       | Evaluate use of coastal waterways   | X  | X   | X   | X  | X  |       | X  | X  | X  |
| 47                       | Analyze host nation population, government, military, demographics and threat   |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |
| 48                       | Evaluate political structure, economics, foreign policy and relations, policies on military use   |    |     | X   |    |    | X     | X  | X  |    |

# Collateral Missions

Step 1. Describe Battlefield Environment

| A  |   | B                 |      | C  | D  | E  | F                | G | H  |
|----|---|-------------------|------|----|----|----|------------------|---|----|
| 1  | Supplemental IPB Factors  | Coalition Support | CSAR | CD | HM | HA | Peace Operations |   | SA |
| 2  | Sympathies and reactions of regional population and organizations   | X                 | X    | X  | X  | X  | X                | X | X  |
| 3  | Threat, host nation, regional, and coalition partner national economies   |                   |      | X  |    |    |                  | X |    |
| 4  | Threat, host nation, regional, and coalition partner national legal systems   |                   |      |    |    |    |                  | X |    |
| 5  | Support base and political objectives of the threat government  |                   |      |    |    |    |                  | X |    |
| 6  | Influence of the terrain and weather on military operations   |                   | X    |    | X  | X  | X                | X |    |
| 7  | Ability of the local infrastructure to support operations   |                   |      | X  | X  | X  | X                | X | X  |
| 8  | Environmental health hazards - presence of persistent agents  | X                 | X    | X  | X  | X  | X                | X | X  |
| 9  | Areas or activities that might generate refugees moving into the AO and refugee flows   |                   |      |    | X  | X  |                  | X |    |
| 10 | Unofficial organizations, including clans and tribes  |                   |      | X  | X  | X  |                  | X |    |
| 11 | Local government, including unofficial parties, meeting sites, activities, contentious issue, etc.  |                   |      |    |    | X  |                  | X |    |
| 12 | Para-military organizations & police forces   | X                 | X    | X  |    | X  |                  | X | X  |
| 13 | Insurgent political or military structure and key personalities & leaders   | X                 |      | X  |    | X  |                  | X |    |
| 14 | Applications of elements of power (military, informational, economic, and political) by any party   |                   |      |    |    | X  |                  | X |    |
| 15 | Threat on or near objective and along ingress/egress routes   |                   | X    | X  |    |    |                  |   |    |
| 16 | Construction of key components of the target (e.g. hardened)  |                   | X    | X  |    |    |                  |   |    |
| 17 | Detection capabilities, battlefield sensors in vicinity of target or ingress/egress route   |                   | X    | X  |    |    |                  |   |    |
| 18 | Reaction time, size, and location of threat reinforcements  |                   | X    | X  |    |    |                  | X |    |
| 19 | Evaluate all demographic factors: ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, political, ideological, tribal, and linguistic groups, locations and densities | X                 |      | X  | X  | X  |                  | X | X  |
| 20 | Key leaders and communicators in area   |                   |      | X  |    | X  |                  | X |    |
| 21 | Cohesive & divisive issues within the community   | X                 |      | X  |    |    |                  | X |    |
| 22 | Attitudes towards the US  | X                 |      | X  | X  | X  |                  | X | X  |
| 23 | Literacy rates and levels of education  | X                 |      |    |    |    |                  | X | X  |
| 24 | Any concentrations of third-country nationals in AO, their purposes and functions   | X                 |      |    |    |    |                  | X |    |

## Collateral Missions

Step 1. Describe Battlefield Environment

|    | A   | B                 | C    | D  | E  | F  | G                | H  |
|----|---|-------------------|------|----|----|----|------------------|----|
|    | Supplemental IPB Factors  | Coalition Support | CSAR | CD | HM | HA | Peace Operations | SA |
| 1  |   |                   |      |    |    |    |                  |    |
| 25 | Recommendation of which groups to focus efforts on  |                   |      |    |    |    | X                |    |
| 26 | Locations, capabilities & accessibility of mass media facilities  | X                 |      |    |    |    | X                |    |
| 27 | Evaluation of host-nation civic action programs   |                   |      |    |    |    | X                |    |
| 28 | Population and resource control   |                   |      |    |    |    | X                |    |
| 29 | Civilian labor  |                   |      |    |    |    | X                |    |
| 30 | Material procurement  |                   |      |    |    |    | X                |    |
| 31 | Hostile government CA strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities   |                   |      |    |    |    | X                |    |
| 32 | Historical or holy sites  | X                 |      |    | X  | X  | X                | X  |
| 33 | Anti-swimmer defenses   | X                 | X    | X  |    |    |                  |    |
| 34 | Identify threat airfields within range of the AO  | X                 | X    | X  |    |    | X                |    |
| 35 | Identify possible flight routes outside the AO  |                   | X    | X  |    |    | X                |    |
| 36 | Effectiveness of host nation military and law enforcement agencies  | X                 |      | X  |    | X  | X                |    |
| 37 | Host nation counter drug efforts  |                   |      | X  |    |    | X                |    |
| 38 | Identify pertinent demographic and economic issues (living conditions, religious beliefs, cultural distinctions, allocation of wealth, political grievances, social status, political affiliations) | X                 |      |    |    | X  | X                | X  |
| 39 | Evaluate terrorist activities in nations that sponsor terrorist groups  |                   |      |    |    | X  | X                |    |
| 40 | Identify any time constraints that might limit the availability of a target   |                   |      | X  |    |    |                  |    |
| 41 | Identify threat reaction forces   | X                 | X    | X  |    |    |                  |    |
| 42 | Evaluate target area  | X                 | X    | X  | X  | X  | X                |    |
| 43 | Identify the locations of all groups that might influence NEO   |                   | X    |    |    |    |                  |    |
| 44 | Identify outside influences on peace enforcement (e.g. world organizations and news media)  |                   |      |    |    | X  | X                |    |
| 45 | Evaluate strategic location; neighboring countries, boundaries, and frontiers   |                   | X    | X  | X  | X  | X                |    |
| 46 | Evaluate use of coastal waterways   | X                 | X    | X  |    | X  | X                | X  |
| 47 | Analyze host nation population, government, military, demographics and threat   | X                 |      |    |    | X  | X                |    |
| 48 | Evaluate political structure, economics, foreign policy and relations, policies on military use   | X                 |      |    |    | X  | X                |    |